Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction,
and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Plaintiff sues defendant in state court, relying solely on state
law. Defendant removes the action to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.1 As grounds for removal, defendant alleges
that Congress has preempted the state law on which plaintiff relies, so that the only law under which plaintiff can possibly state a
claim for relief is federal, and that the action therefore "arises
under" federal law.2 Plaintiff moves to remand the case, arguing
that the district court lacks jurisdiction because the complaint
does not by its terms invoke federal law. This hypothetical case
raises an important and difficult question as to the interpretation
of the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which limits the original federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3 Under the wellpleaded complaint rule, neither a federal defense nor the plaintiff's
anticipation of a federal defense in his complaint suffices to vest
original jurisdiction in a federal court. 4 Arguing that federal preemption is merely a defense, the plaintiff in this hypothetical case
might contend that removal is barred, since section 1441 limits removal to cases in which the federal district court would have had
original jurisdiction.5 Since federal preemption is raised by the defendant in this case, the well-pleaded complaint rule would appear
to require that the district court remand the action to state court.
The federal courts have long struggled over whether, and
under what circumstances, removal could be based on a defendant's allegations of federal preemption. In Franchise Tax Board
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).

The Constitution extends federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies "arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
2

be made, under their authority." U.S. CONsT. art. Il, § 2, cl. 1. Original jurisdiction in the
federal district courts over civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States" is conferred by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). In this comment the
former will be referred to as constitutional federal question jurisdiction, the latter as statutory federal question jurisdiction. For further discussion of the differences between the two,
see infra notes 9-47 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841
(1983); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, 415 U.S. 125 (1974); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299
U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
4 See cases cited supra note 3; infra notes 9-47 and accompanying text.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976).
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v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,' the Supreme Court for
the first time directly addressed the preemption removal problem.7 It indicated that removal is proper if "a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action [because] any
complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law.""
Although Franchise Tax Board recognized that preemption
removal is proper in some instances, the Court failed to explain
how preemption removal fits into the overall framework of original
federal jurisdiction and the well-pleaded complaint rule. Since the
relationship between federal preemption and a plaintiff's cause of
action is frequently quite complex, the ambiguities of Franchise
Tax Board may render its application to future cases difficult. In
addition, the Court failed to discuss approaches to the preemption
removal problem that had previously been taken by lower courts.
As a result, the continuing validity of the "artful pleading doctrine," which permits removal where the plaintiff has manipulated
his complaint to avoid presenting a federal question, is left unclear.
Nor does Franchise Tax Board resolve whether preemption removal is ever proper when the preempting federal law does not
create a superseding cause of action.
This comment seeks to answer these questions by exploring
the implications of Franchise Tax Board for the interpretation of
the well-pleaded complaint rule. Part I considers the well-pleaded
complaint rule's history and purposes, and reveals a recurrent ambiguity in the Court's pronouncements as to whether the rule requires that a federal question be presented by the language of the
complaint or whether a court can look beyond the face of the complaint to ascertain the underlying nature of the plaintiff's cause of
action. Part II presents the approaches to preemption removal
taken prior to FranchiseTax Board, and concludes that the lower
courts' difficulties with the preemption removal problem reflect the
tension created by the ambiguity in the well-pleaded complaint
rule. Finally, Part III examines Franchise Tax Board's resolution
of this tension. It suggests that the decision is consistent with an
interpretation of the rule that focuses on the plaintiff's underlying
6 103

S. Ct. 2841 (1983).
The Court appeared to approve of preemption removal in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), aff'g 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967). Although the FranchiseTax
Board Court treated Avco as if it had settled the question, 103 S. Ct. at 2853-54, the Court's
opinion in Avco itself is less explicit. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
7

8 103 S. Ct. at 2854.
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cause of action, and considers the implications of that interpretation for the artful pleading doctrine and the requirement that preemption jurisdiction be based on a superseding federal cause of
action.
I. THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE

The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
United States shall extend to all cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their authority."9 This "federal question" jurisdiction helps to insure uniformity in the construction and interpretation of federal law, and provides a federal forum for the vindication of federally created rights in the face of potential statecourt hostility. 10 For most of the nineteenth century, Congress apparently felt that appellate review by federal courts of federal issues decided by state courts adequately served these purposes;1 1
the first permanent grant of original federal question jurisdiction
was not enacted until the Judiciary Act of 1875.12
Although Congress couched its grant of original federal question jurisdiction in language identical to that found in article III,"3
this statutory language has been construed more narrowly than its
9
10

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (Story, J.); AmEmi-

CAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIvSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS 164-68 (1969); D. CURRImE, FEDERAL COURTS 160 (3d ed. 1982); Hornstein, Federalism, JudicialPower and the "Arising Under" Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 564-65 (1981).
An additional purpose for original federal question jurisdiction is to establish a body of
courts with special expertise in construing federal law. Further, given the impossibility of
Supreme Court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) of all state court decisions of federal
law due to the magnitude of the Court's current case load, original federal question jurisdiction provides many litigants with their only real opportunity to obtain a federal forum to
decide their federal claims. See D. CURRIE, supra, at 160. Finally, appellate review may not
always be sufficient to vindicate federally created rights because, as fact-finder, a state court
retains substantial capacity to control the shape and outcome of litigation. See England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1964).
" Such review was provided for in § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982)). The Judiciary Act of 1789 created inferior federal courts, see id. §§ 2-4, with original jurisdiction over
diversity suits, suits in admiralty, and a few other kinds of cases, see id. §§ 9, 11. It did not
grant original federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts.
12Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1982)). Congress granted original federal question jurisdiction briefly in the Midnight
Judges Act, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89 (1801), which was repealed in 1802, Act of Mar. 8, 1802,
ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132; see Hornstein, supra note 10, at 565 n.8.
1" Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1982)).
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constitutional counterpart by the application to it of the wellpleaded complaint rule. 14 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule,
jurisdiction may not be based on a plaintiff's anticipation in his
complaint of a federal defense or a federal response to a possible
defense. 15 The rule is carried over to the removal context by virtue
of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which limits removal to cases over which federal district courts would have had original jurisdiction. 6
14 For a long time, there was considerable doubt whether the well-pleaded complaint
rule was a constitutional as well as a statutory limitation on federal question jurisdiction.
There is language in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)
(Marshall, C.J.), the preeminent early case construing the scope of constitutional federal
question jurisdiction, that might be read to imply a constitutional well-pleaded complaint
rule: "[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredientof the original cause, it is within the power of Congress to give
. . . jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in
it." Id. at 823 (emphasis added). Judge Friendly apparently reads Osbornthis way. See T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964) (Osborn extends the constitutional
limits of original federal question jurisdiction "to every case in which federal law furnished a
necessary ingredient of the claim." (emphasis added)). Other language in Osborn, however,
would tend to suggest that this reference to the original cause is not intended to limit the
constitutional reach of original jurisdiction. For example, Chief Justice Marshall also stated
that original federal question jurisdiction could be conferred over any case to which appellate jurisdiction extends, see Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 820-21, which, given the constitutionality of appellate federal question jurisdiction over federal defenses, see Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824
("The questions which the case involves, then, must determine its character, whether those
questions be made in the cause or not."), implies that original jurisdiction could be conferred over cases involving federal defenses.
Osborn has not, in fact, generally been read to impose the well-pleaded complaint rule
as a constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 471 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("traditional interpretation" of Osborn and other
cases is that jurisdiction may be extended to any case involving "potential federal questions"); Hornstein, supra note 10, at 576. Recently, the Supreme Court settled the dispute,
locating the source of the well-pleaded complaint rule in the statutory grant of jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), and not in the Constitution. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank, 103 S.
Ct. 1962, 1972 (1983) (upholding 28 U.S.C. § 1330, which provides for original jurisdiction in
federal court over cases involving foreign sovereigns or their representatives, despite the fact
the plaintiff's claim for relief did not depend on any issue of federal law). For further discussion of Verlinden and the constitutional implications of the well-pleaded complaint rule,
see infra notes 22, 25 and accompanying text.
1" See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). For further discussion of
Mottley, see infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
16 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). Under early versions of the removal statute federal defense removal was routinely granted. E.g., Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1888)
(construing the removal provision of the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470
(amended 1887)). In Tennessee v. Union & Planters Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894), the Supreme
Court construed removal under the Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552
(amending Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470). Relying on language recently added
to the statute, which provided for removal of cases "arising under [federal law] of which the
. . . courts of the United States are given originaljurisdiction," id. (emphasis added), the
Court held that a federal matter raised as a defense to a state-law claim could not form the
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The case most frequently cited in support of the well-pleaded
17
complaint rule is Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley.
Mottley, the plaintiff, alleged in her complaint that a federal statute on which the railroad was expected to rely in defense was unconstitutional, and sought to use this allegation as the basis for
federal question jurisdiction. Although the validity of the railroad's
defense had been litigated below, the Court raised the jurisdictional defect sua sponte, holding that "a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's
statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon
those laws or that Constitution." 18 Consequently, the Court concluded, " 'a suggestion of one party, that the other will or may set
up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
does not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or
those laws' ,,;19 the Court dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. The Court did not explain or justify its holding, but simply
declared it to be a "settled interpretation," citing a number of
cases in support of the rule.2"
Although it has been the target of substantial criticism, particularly as applied in the removal context,21 and despite its long history, the rationale of the well-pleaded complaint rule has seldom
been thoroughly analyzed. It is clear, however, that the wellpleaded complaint rule serves an important purpose in the scheme
of federal jurisdiction by limiting the reach of original federal

basis for removal. 152 U.S. at 461-62. Although the statutory language relied on by the
Court appears to compel application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to removal, an alternative interpretation has been offered suggesting that the language merely refers to and
incorporates the requirement of a minimum amount in controversy for original jurisdiction.
See Hornstein, supra note 10, at 606 n.234. This alternative interpretation could not apply
to the current removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982), because there is no longer a
requirement of an amount in controversy for original federal question jurisdiction. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat.
2369, 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) so as to repeal amount-in-controversy requirement of statutory original federal question jurisdiction).
17 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
Is Id. at 152.
19 Id. at 153 (quoting Tennessee v. Union & Planters Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 464 (1894)).
20 Id. at 152; see id. at 154 (string-citing 18 Supreme Court cases in support of the
rule).
21 See, e.g., AMERMAN LAW INSTrrUTE, supra note 10, § 1311 (proposing a rule allowing
federal defense removal where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000); Hornstein,
supra note 10, at 608 (proposing general federal defense removal); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 216, 233-34
(1948). But see H. FRIENDLY, supra note 10, at 124 (arguing that federal defense removal
would overburden federal courts). A thorough discussion of the desirability of federal defense removal is beyond the scope of this comment.
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question jurisdiction. In contrast to appellate jurisdiction, where
the questions before the court are fixed by the decision below and
by the questions presented on appeal, it is unclear at the time a
court exercises original jurisdiction precisely which issues will arise
during the course of the litigation.2 A federal question might be
raised during the course of virtually any litigation. 3 Thus, to base
original federal question jurisdiction on the existence of merely potential federal questions in a case would render illusory the limitation of federal jurisdiction in article III to specifically enumerated
classes of cases. The well-pleaded complaint rule avoids this
consequence.
To say that the well-pleaded complaint rule is designed to
limit original federal question jurisdiction, however, does not, without more, justify it. The well-pleaded complaint rule withdraws
from original federal jurisdiction a large number of cases that
eventually do turn on the validity of a federal defense, and such
cases are within the purposes of federal question jurisdiction.2 4
One is therefore required to articulate a rationale for the particular
limit placed on federal jurisdiction by the well-pleaded complaint
rule.
The well-pleaded complaint rule does solve one obvious problem with predicating original jurisdiction on a federal defense: that
the defense may never be raised. The proposition that a case arises
under a law that is never raised during the entire course of an action seems untenable.2 5 Since, however, in the removal context the
12

See Hornstein, supra note 10, at 605.

23 The existence of a potential federal question in virtually every litigation is apparent
insofar as the existence of federal jurisdiction is itself a federal question and, more impor-

tantly, insofar as every state law or procedural rule may be constitutionally challenged. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.), is fre-

quently interpreted as enunciating the view that original constitutional federal question
jurisdiction extends to any case in which there is a potential federal question. See supra

note 14. Whether so broad a reading of Osborn is correct was discussed but left open by the
Court in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1971 (1983). See also infra note 25
and accompanying text (discussing Verlinden).
4 E.g., protecting federal rights and insuring uniform interpretation of federal law. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21This conclusion, however, insofar as it suggests that the well-pleaded complaint rule
ought to be read as a limitation on the reach of article I, appears to be inconsistent with
the Court's recent conclusion that the well-pleaded complaint rule is solely a matter of stat-

utory interpretation. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1972 (1983). In Ver-

linden, the Court upheld § 2 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §
1330 (1982), which gives the district courts jurisdiction over nonjury civil actions against
foreign states. Jurisdiction under § 1330 extends to cases in which the only federal issue is

the availability under the Act of the defense of sovereign immunity. The Court stated that
the well-pleaded complaint rule is a rule of statutory construction, applicable only to § 1331.
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federal defense may in fact have been raised by the defendant at
the time he seeks removal, the application of the rule to bar removal based on a federal defense suggests that this concern is not
the only one addressed by the rule.
Unlike the concern with avoiding federal jurisdiction over
cases in which issues of federal law are never actually raised, a second reason for limiting original jurisdiction to cases in which the
plaintiff relies on federal law does apply to the removal context.
This reason, that federal jurisdiction is more appropriate where issues of federal law are likely to dominate, supports the wellpleaded complaint rule provided one accepts the intuitively appealing presumption that if the plaintiff relies on federal law in
stating his claim, federal issues are more likely to dominate the
action, while if federal law appears only as a defense (or a reply to
a defense) to a state-law cause of action, it is likely that many of
the dominant issues to be decided will be questions of state law.26
Thus, the Court did not apply the rule in Verlinden to invalidate the lower court's assertion
of jurisdiction under § 1330. 103 S. Ct. at 1972-73.
That Verlinden rejected a constitutional basis for the well-pleaded complaint rule is
not as certain as it might seem at first glance. The Court did not reach the issue whether
jurisdiction could constitutionally be based on a purely speculative potential federal question, because "a suit against a foreign state under this Act necessarily raises questions of
substantive federal law at the very outset . . . ." Id. at 1971. The Court reasoned that a
federal question was necessarily presented in every case under the Act because the Act requires the plaintiff to establish the existence of one of the statutorily specified exceptions to
the defense of sovereign immunity in order to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 1971 & n.20. Under this reasoning, the federal question is in fact raised by the plaintiff's complaint, and the statute in question is perfectly consistent with a constitutional
well-pleaded complaint rule. Thus, Verlinden can be read as stopping short of approving
original jurisdiction based on a federal question that has not been raised at the time jurisdiction attaches.
Even if Verlinden does provide authority for the proposition that the well-pleaded complaint rule is not constitutionally mandated, it is clear that if the notion of limited jurisdiction is to have any meaning at all, there must be a line drawn beyond which the mere
possibility of a federal question arising is too remote to countenance an assertion of federal
jurisdiction. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Where there has been a narrow
grant of jurisdiction over a specific class of cases, such as the jurisdictional grant at issue in
Verlinden, it is relatively certain that a federal question will be presented, even where it has
not been raised in the complaint. Where the jurisdictional grant is general, such as that in §
1331, however, an interpretation of article IH which would allow original federal jurisdiction
over any case that contained even the mere possibility of a federal question, would allow
unlimited federal jurisdiction since every case contains at least such a possibility, see supra
note 23 and accompanying text. There, a constitutional rule delineating those instances in
which the potential federal question is too speculative is necessary to preserve any scope for
state jurisdiction in the face of a general grant of federal question jurisdiction.
2' That selecting those cases in which federal issues are more likely to dominate is in
fact the more likely purpose of the rule is supported not only by cases that rely on such an
analysis to decide whether the rule applies, see FranchiseTax Board, 103 S. Ct. 2841; Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 339 U.S. 667 (1950), but by operation of the rule itself.
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Thus, the well-pleaded complaint rule may be regarded as limiting
federal jurisdiction to cases in which federal issues are likely to
predominate. Though this rationale serves to justify the rule, it
complicates its application. The Mottley Court's formulation of
the rule, which requires that the plaintiff's statement of his own
cause of action must raise the federal question, 7 is too crude a tool
for application to the many complexities of federal jurisdiction.
The Court in Mottley itself found that plaintiff's statement improperly raised a federal question because it did so in anticipation
of a defense. Thus, the Court ignored the plaintiff's statement and
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The root of the difficulty in applying the Mottley formulation
of the rule is the difficulty in determining what the plaintiff's cause
of action is in a given case. Mottley is unclear about the extent to
which the court should rely on "the plaintiff's statement" or look
beyond the face of the complaint to determine if his cause of action really does involve federal issues. As a consequence, the Court
was required in subsequent cases to refine the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Early cases emphasized those aspects of the Mottley formulation of the well-pleaded complaint rule that focused on "the plaintiff's statement." While recognizing that a plaintiff could not obtain a federal forum by anticipating a defense (the Mottley case
itself), these cases generally considered the language of the complaint dispositive. The leading authority for this approach is Gully
v. First National Bank,2 8 in which the Court held that removal of
an action to collect a state tax by levying on assets of a taxpayer
held by a national bank could not properly be based on a federal
statute permitting states to tax national banks. Justice Cardozo,
writing for the Court, traced the confused course of opinions that
attempted to ascertain whether a suit arises under federal law,2
and concluded that the federal question "must be an element, and

Removal is not permitted when the defendant raises a federal defense, and thus presumably
has an interest in having it adjudicated in a federal forum. Nor does a given plaintiff have
access to federal courts when, as the issues have developed, he relies, by way of replication,
on assertion of a federal right. The logical inference from these observations is that it is
concern for the issues alone, and not for the parties, which is at work, and, in fact, the
federal courts will not take jurisdiction under § 1331 unless it is more than likely that federal issues will predominate, even where the complaint raises a federal question on its face.
See Wechsler, supra note 21, at 233-34; cf. infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing the search for the underlying cause of action in the declaratory judgment context).
27Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152.
" 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
2 Id. at 112-16.
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an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action . . . and . . .

must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint unaided by the
answer or by the petition for removal ...

."SO Although this lan-

guage has its antecedents in Mottley,31 Gully placed particular emphasis on a strict limitation to the language of the plaintiff's complaint. Gully incorporates into the well-pleaded complaint rule the
doctrine that the plaintiff is master of his own complaint,32 since,
under Gully, the complaint is considered to be absolutely dispositive of the cause of action.
This focus on the language of the plaintiff's complaint seems
intended to simplify the application of the well-pleaded complaint
rule. The limitation to the language of the complaint itself, according to Justice Cardozo, is the product of considerable experience
with the difficulties of applying the rule and a resulting desire to
find a formulation that is simple to apply." The advantages of
such a formulation in terms of administrability are obvious.
Gully's focus on the language of the complaint saves considerable
time and expense, and enhances the predictability, reliability, uniformity, and reviewability of results. 4 Indeed, strict adherence to
Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added).
See 211 U.S. at 152; supra text accompanying note 18.
32 See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). The relationship
30

"1

between the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint and original federal question jurisdiction
was also pointed out in The Fair:"[T]he party who brings a suit... determine[s] whether
he will bring a 'suit arising under' [federal law]. That question cannot depend upon the
answer. . . ." 228 U.S. at 25. This statement was qualified in a dictum later in the opinion,
id.; see infra note 36, and appears to be inconsistent with the rationale of Franchise Tax
Board, see infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
33 Justice Cardozo specifically rejected as "hazard[ous]" the argument that the Court
should look beyond the face of the complaint in order to determine the true character of the
plaintiff's "'cause of action.'" 299 U.S. at 117. He argued that "[w]hat is needed is something of that common-sense accomodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which
characterizes the law in its treatment of causation," id., and contended that the wellpleaded complaint rule, with the limitation to the face of the complaint, was the product of
"a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other
ones aside," id. at 118. The rule formulated as a result of this experience, he concluded,
must be adhered to: "We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by." Id.
34 One might also justify the Gully formulation of the rule by arguing that the Court
should restrict its analysis to the complaint out of deference to a plaintiff's right to waive
any federal rights he may have and plead only his state law claims. This rationale is inadequate for several reasons. First, nowhere in Gully is it mentioned as a consideration for the
rule, while simplicity of application figures prominently in Justice Cardozo's opinion. See
supra note 33. Second, a plaintiff's right to waive any federal claims he has is not denied by
looking beyond his complaint. The question is, rather, how deeply the court may examine
the case in order to determine whether a plaintiff is asserting such claims. The difficulty
arises from the close relation the right to waive federal claims bears to the plaintiff's right to
choose a forum. For a demonstration that the plaintiff's right to choose a forum cannot
justify the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in the removal context, see infra
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the Gully language-of-the-complaint requirement would make the
jurisdictional inquiry a very simple one, since the court need consider only a single document.
Other facets of the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, suggest that administrative convenience and the plaintiff's mastery of
his own complaint are of secondary importance in applying the
rule. For example, Mottley requires courts to disregard those of
plaintiff's allegations that anticipate a defense,35 thereby limiting
the plaintiff's mastery of his own complaint and evincing the
court's willingness to hazard the administratively more difficult inquiry into which allegations in a complaint are essential. Furthermore, the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to removal does not appear to be motivated by concern for the
plaintiff's mastery of his complaint.3 7 Finally, the refusal to consider the language of the removal petition or answer cannot be
said to enhance significantly the administrability of the rule 3 8 par-

note 37.
33 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
3' The Court in The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913), noted in
dicta that "if it should appear that the plaintiff was not really relying upon [federal law] for
his alleged rights ... the case might be dismissed [for lack of jurisdiction]." See also supra
notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing Mottley).
Of course, there is a difference between determining that a plaintiff has pleaded too
much and looking beyond the complaint to see whether the plaintiff has pleaded enough.
With the former inquiry, the court may stop at the complaint and apply established rules of
law to the stated cause of action in order to decide which elements are part of the prima
facie case and which anticipate affirmative defenses. Nonetheless, even this inquiry will
often be extremely difficult, especially in light of modern notice pleading rules. See infra
note 39 and accompanying text.
"' Removal does not affect the plaintiff's cause of action; it does, however, limit his
traditionally unfettered choice of a forum, often considered a corollary to the plaintiff's
mastery of his complaint. The application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to deny federal
defense removal cannot be based on an overriding desire to preserve the plaintiff's choice of
forum. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. It would be wholly anomalous to
allow a defendant to defeat the plaintiff's actual choice of forum, state court, in order to
have the plaintiff's rights vindicated in a federal forum, while holding the plaintiff's choice
of a nonfederal forum to be dispositive when the defendant asserts a federal right. This
anomaly will, of course, be present to some degree as long as § 1441 predicates removal on
the availability of federal jurisdiction as an original matter. See Wechsler, supra note 21, at
233-34.
38 To the extent that the well-pleaded complaint rule is intended to insure that federal
law has in fact been raised by the party relying on it, the court need only read the answer or
removal petition to see whether there is any reliance on federal law. Insofar as the number
of pleadings to be considered remains limited, there would be little or no loss in any of the
factors served by administratively simple rules: cost and time savings, predictability, reliability, uniformity, and reviewability.
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ticularly with the advent of lenient notice pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. e
An alternative reading of the Mottley decision emphasizes the
phrase "cause of action." Under this approach to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the court may look beyond the plaintiff's complaint
in order to establish the true nature of the underlying dispute as
either state or federal. A striking example of this reading, surprisingly4 1 enough, 40 is found in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co.,

where the Court held that original jurisdiction over declara-

tory judgment actions must be tested by reference to an underlying action for damages or injunction rather than the complaint for
declaratory relief.4 2 Thus, although the complaint for declaratory
relief in Skelly Oil properly alleged a federal right relied upon by
the declaratory judgment plaintiff, the Court held that the federal
right was "injected into the case only in anticipation of a defense"
because the underlying contract claim arose under state law.'3
Skelly Oil presents a very different view of the well-pleaded complaint rule from that expressed in Gully. Under Skelly Oil, it is
incumbent upon a court to look beyond a declaratory judgment
complaint's proper reliance on federal law in order to recharacterize the cause of action in terms of the underlying dispute. The
Court must construct a hypothetical law suit and examine that suit
39 It is noteworthy that Gully was decided before the adoption, in 1938, of notice pleading in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 86 (1938), in 309 U.S. 645,
766 (1939). Modem pleading requirements are more lax even than those of the Field Code
in force in Gully. The effect of modern pleading rules is difficult to measure, however, since
courts that have abandoned the Gully approach for a more open-ended inquiry into the
underlying nature of the plaintiff's cause of action have not attributed any significance to
the state of pleading rules. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950);
see also infra notes 49-94 and accompanying text (discussing approaches that look beyond
the face of the complaint).
40 It is surprising because Justice Frankfurter, no friend of expansive federal jurisdiction, rejected the Gully language-of-the-complaint standard and looked through the plaintiff's complaint to the underlying cause of action in order to avoid an expansion of federal
jurisdiction arising from the Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 343, 48 Stat. 955 (1934)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)). See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671-72. Part II of
this comment demonstrates that the lower courts adopted a similar integration of the wellpleaded complaint rule in order to expand federal jurisdiction in preemption removal cases.
It is this theory of the well-pleaded complaint rule that Franchise Tax Board adopts. See
infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. Thus, the approach has come full circle: used by
the Supreme Court to limit federal jurisdiction in Skelly Oil, it is picked up by the lower
courts as a means of expanding federal jurisdiction in preemption removal cases and is
finally reembraced by the Supreme Court in that guise in Franchise Tax Board.
41 339 U.S. 667 (1950).

42 Id. at 671-74.
4

Id. at 672.
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to determine whether or not the genuine dispute is based on state
or federal law."'
To the extent that Skelly Oil requires the courts, in applying
the well-pleaded complaint rule, to unravel declaratory judgment
actions in order to identify the underlying cause of action, a certain consistency is imposed on the application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. Whether the action is one originally filed in federal
court, an action removed to federal court by the defendant, or a
declaratory judgment action, jurisdiction is tested on the basis of
the cause of action of the party who actually or hypothetically
seeks affirmative relief. This consistency is achieved, however, at
the price of administrative convenience.
It is still necessary to ask how the purposes of the wellpleaded complaint rule are served by requiring the court to identify the underlying cause of action in declaratory judgment actions.
The complaint for declaratory relief properly relies on federal law,
so that federal law has been raised at the time jurisdiction attaches. The essential purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule,
however, is to screen out cases that are primarily state-law mat44 Although the Court rested its holding in Skelly Oil in part on its interpretation of
the Declaratory Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 343, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)), the Court also discussed the importance of preserving general limits
on original federal jurisdiction: "[It] would turn into the federal courts a vast current of
litigation indubitably arising under State law, in the sense that the right to be vindicated
was State-created, if a suit for a declaration of rights could be brought into the federal
courts merely because an anticipated defense derived from federal law." 339 U.S. at 673.
This language suggests that the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to the
declaratory judgment claims is not merely an interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment
Act, but rather also furthers the purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule itself. This
conclusion is supported by the extension, in FranchiseTax Board, of the Skelly Oil principle to declaratory judgment proceedings brought pursuant to state statutes. FranchiseTax
Board, 103 S. Ct. at 2851. The FranchiseTax Board Court based its extension of Skelly Oil
to state declaratory judgment statutes at least in part upon an effort to preserve the intended limits of the federal declaratory judgment statute, id. at 2851, and one might argue
that this extension is thus merely a preemptive application of the federal statute. However,
this argument attributes a great deal of force to a legislative intent that was only inferred in
Skelly Oil itself. See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671, where the Court relied on a statement in
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), that the Declaratory Judgment Act
was "procedural only." The Aetna Court, however, was concerned with the question
whether the Declaratory Judgment Act had impermissibly given federal courts jurisdiction
over matters not cases or controversies within the limitation of article I, and did not purport to address the Act's effect on federal question jurisdiction. See Aetna, 300 U.S. at 23940. The Skelly Oil Court simply applied the language quoted from Aetna to the problem of
assessing the existence of federal question jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to the
Act without explanation or qualification. A more plausible explanation for the Court's decision in FranchiseTax Board is that the Skelly Oil principle inheres in the nature of the
jurisdictional inquiry as applied to declaratory judgment actions. See Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at
673.
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ters, even though a federal issue lurks in the background.4 5 The
unusual procedural posture a case assumes as a result of the declaratory judgment remedy makes Gully's focus on the language of
the complaint inadequate. It is precisely to accomplish the objectives of the well-pleaded complaint rule that the Court abandons
Gully and examines the underlying nature of the dispute.
As the above discussion suggests, it was difficult to find a single consistent method for applying the well-pleaded complaint
rule, despite its long history as the standard for assessing statutory
federal question jurisdiction. The competing approaches exemplified by Gully and Skelly Oil rendered application of the rule in
complex areas difficult, and led to confusing and often contradictory results. 48 Thus, it is not surprising that the lower federal
courts were in "disarray" over the preemption removal problem.4 7
II.

PREEMPTION REMOVAL IN THE LOWER COURTS

The preemption removal problem is of relatively recent origin,
perhaps because it was not until recently that the proliferation of
federal regulation provided such an expansive field in which federal law might be said to preempt state law under the supremacy
clause of article VI.48 Perhaps responding to the perceived need to
45 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
46 For example, where a party seeks an injunction against the enforcement of an alleg-

edly unconstitutional state law, his position is virtually identical to that of a plaintiff seeking a declaration that the law is unconstitutional. Both plaintiffs anticipate an "underlying"
action based on state law. In the injunction context, however, the court makes its jurisdictional determination on the basis of the complaint for injunctive relief, rather than attempting to recharacterize the claim in terms of an "underlying" cause of action. See, e.g., Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Another example of such difficulties is the Court's inconsistent treatment of original
jurisdiction in cases based on the incorporation of federal law into a state law cause of
action. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921)
(upholding federal jurisdiction over a state law action against a trust for investment in invalid securities, where validity of securities turned on federal law), and Standard Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483 (1942) (upholding federal jurisdiction over action by post exchange to recover state taxes based on state law exempting United States government from
tax, where status of post exchange as part of the United States government was a question
of federal law), with Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 214-17 (1934) (denying
federal jurisdiction over state action incorporating standards of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts). For further discussion of the incorporation problem, see Note, 66 HARv. L. Ray.
1498 (1953). See also infra notes 49-94 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption
removal problem in the lower courts).
47 Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Members of Lodges 1088 & 1142, Internat'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 535 F. Supp. 167, 169 n.1 (D.R.I. 1982).
48 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), was apparently the first reported case allowing preemption removal. Since
the 1951 decision in Fay, the preemption removal issue has appeared rather regularly in the
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vindicate strong federal policy interests in areas of pervasive federal regulation, the lower courts advanced various related theories
for allowing removal based on preemption despite the fact that
preemption was first raised defensively.4 A number of courts, however, applied the well-pleaded complaint rule flatly to reject preemption removal.50
A.

The Emergence of Preemption Removal

This apparent conflict between the requirements of the wellpleaded complaint rule and the need for a federal forum to vindicate strong federal interests first surfaced in the field of labor law.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 5 1 the Court held that
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
("LMRA")5 2 empowered the courts to create a body of federal
common law. The Court reasoned that the statute "expresses a
federal policy that the federal courts should enforce [collective bargaining] agreements. 53 This policy of federal enforcement would
be defeated, however, if a plaintiff could avoid federal jurisdiction
by refusing to allege federal law in his complaint.5

courts. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), aft'g, 376 F.2d 337
(6th Cir. 1967); Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1966); Hearst Corp. v. Shopping
Center Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v.
Strickland Transp. Co., 270 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959); Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F.
Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Irving Subway Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp. 671
(E.D.N.Y. 1953). For further discussion of Fay, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying
text.
"t See infra notes 69-71, 79-83 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that the
first reported case allowing preemption removal, Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.,
98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), was handed down in the year following Skelly Oil.
Whether the court took Skelly Oil as a sign that it was proper to look beyond the complaint
is difficult to know, since Fay does not cite Skelly Oil, but it would be at least somewhat
ironic if the latter opinion, which expressed a policy against expanding federal jurisdiction,
see supra note 44, were discovered to provide implicit support for that result.
50 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
51353 U.S. 448 (1957).
52 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
53353 U.S. at 455. Lincoln Mills itself did not hold that § 301 of the LMRA preempted
the entire field of labor law. The questions of concurrent state jurisdiction and the status of
state law remedies in state courts were left open.
" Several qualifications are necessary. First, since federal jurisdiction under § 301 is
not exclusive, see supra note 53, any inference of the policy favoring federal enforcement is
somewhat weakened. Second, one can argue that, insofar as the policy is, at bottom, a defendant's right to a federal forum, it begs the question to assert that there is a conflict between
the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint and the defendant's right to a federal forum: if the
well-pleaded complaint rule bars removal, defendant has no such right and the interest
identified is one protected by appeal rather than by removal. See supra note 24. This corn-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:634

This difficulty was presented to the federal district court in
Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.,55 which also involved
jurisdiction under section 301 of the LMRA, and is the seminal
case for allowing preemption removal. 6 Although the plaintiff in
Fay couched his complaint solely in terms of state law, the court
invoked the rule that "where federal jurisdiction hinges on the parties', or one of them, having a particular status, the court may ascertain the existence of that status independently of the complaint."5 The plaintiff's status as "a union representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce" placed it within the ambit of
section 301."8 The court held that in light of the creation of a body
of substantive federal law under section 301, federal law had preempted the field of collective bargaining agreements, and the
plaintiff therefore could not choose to rely solely on state law.59
In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,6o the Supreme Court

tacitly approved the Fay rationale. The plaintiff in Avco did not
rely on federal law in his complaint, but the court of appeals approved removal based on reasoning similar to that in Fay.61 The
Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction without mentioning the wellpleaded complaint rule, stating simply that "[a]n action arising
under § 301 is controlled by federal substantive law even though it
is brought in a state court." 2 Thus, it was "clear" that the claim
ment will argue that such an analysis is inappropriate after Franchise Tax Board, which
acknowledges the power of the court to look beyond the complaint and recharacterize the
dispute in order to vindicate the particularly strong federal interest associated with certain
kinds of preemption. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
55 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

56Fay could not rely on Lincoln Mills to establish § 301 preemption; Lincoln Mills was
decided six years later. Fay cited Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950), a precursor of Lincoln Mills, to establish § 301 preemption.
11 98 F. Supp. at 280. The court explained that the status rule previously had been
applied to ascertain the existence of diversity of citizenship, and the federal nature of a
receiver, a corporation, and a marshal. Id.
58Id. at 280-81.
59

Id.

60 390 U.S. 557 (1968). Avco was relied on by the Court in Franchise Tax Board. See
103 S.Ct. at 2853; infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
"I See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, 376 F.2d 337, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1967), afl'd, 390 U.S.
557 (1968). Citing Lincoln Mills, the court of appeals stated:
State law does not exist as an independent source of private rights to enforce collective
bargaining contracts. While State courts may have concurrent jurisdiction, they are
bound to apply Federal law .... The force of Federal preemption in this area of labor
law cannot be avoided by failing to mention Section 301 in the complaint.
Id. at 340 (citation omitted). Consequently, the court held, Avco's claim arose under federal
law and removal was proper. Id.
62 390 U.S. at 560 (footnote omitted). While the Supreme. Court has stated that "when
questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, th[e] Court has
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was within the original jurisdiction of the district court, and hence
properly removed.6 3 After Avco, preemption removal became well
established in the field of labor law."6
The success of preemption removal in the labor law context
encouraged defendants to seek removal based on allegations of federal preemption in other regulatory contexts such as interstate
shipping, 5 intellectual property, 6 and banking.6 7 Attempts to renever considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue
before [the Court]," Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (1974), the applicability of that
principle in interpreting Arco is open to question. The Hagans Court referred to jurisdictional questions raised after decisions rendered on the merits without any consideration of
jurisdiction at all. Avco on the other hand was a specific challenge to removal based on the
lack of original jurisdiction in the federal courts. Consequently, the question of jurisdiction
was not passed on sub silentio,and unless the Hagansprinciple is to be extended to encompass the proposition that every subsidiary issue not specifically discussed in an opinion is
completely open, Avco must be taken as at least some support for preemption removal. Of
course, after Franchise Tax Board the specfic issue is moot. See infra notes 96-122 and
accompanying text.
o3390 U.S. at 560. Even assuming the existence of a federal question in the complaint,
the Avco opinion is somewhat obscure about the statutory basis for federal jurisdiction.
Since § 301 is itself a grant of jurisdiction, one might assume that it confers federal jurisdiction over the body of federal common law it authorizes the courts to create. If that were the
case, failure to mention the well-pleaded complaint rule would be understandable, since
§ 301, as a narrow grant of jurisdiction, might be seen as one to which the well-pleaded
complaint rule, as a principle of statutory interpretation, need not apply. See supra note 25
(discussing the applicablity of the well-pleaded complaint rule to narrow, as opposed to
general, grants of jurisdiction). However, Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court,
rested federal jurisdiction not directly on § 301 but on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982), which is a
general grant of federal jurisdiction over "proceedings" related to commerce. 390 U.S. at
561-62. In light of this rationale, it is somewhat surprising that the well-pleaded complaint
was never mentioned, much less applied.
" See, e.g., Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1966); Billy Jack For Her, Inc. v.
New York Coat Workers Union, Local 1-35, 511 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Teamsters
Local Union 116 v. Fargo-Moorhead Auto. Dealers AS'n, 459 F. Supp. 558 (D.N.D. 1978);
Hayes v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Comment, Intimations
of Federal Removal Jurisdictionin Labor Cases: The PleadingNexus, 1981 DUKE L.J. 743,
745-46; see also Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1976)
(holding removal improper because defendant did not establish labor contract as the basis
of plaintiff's claim, therefore rendering § 301 inapplicable). Even courts that otherwise rejected preemption removal recognized the validity of removal in the labor law context. See,
e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 853 (8th Cir. 1980).
16 See, e.g., North Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.
1978) (approving removal of action involving air carrier liability); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp.
v. Strickland Transp. Co., 270 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (approving removal of action
involving liability of common carriers).
4"See, e.g., La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974) (rejecting
preemption removal in trademark context), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1975); Bailey v. Logan Square Typographers, Inc., 441 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1971) (rejecting preemption removal
doctrine in copyright context); Coditron Corp. v. AFA Protective Sys., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognizing preemption removal doctrine but denying removal of patent
action because of lack of preemption); Gardner v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 383 F. Supp.
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move in these contexts met with mixed success.6 s
The principal argument advanced by lower courts for allowing
preemption removal was that where there has been federal preemption, the complaint necessarily presents a federal cause of action. 9 Under this rationale, the court merely determines the real
nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and since, by virtue of federal preemption, the complaint necessarily presents a federal cause
of action, removal does not violate the well-pleaded complaint
rule.7 0 Occasionally, courts went so far as to suggest that there was
an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule whenever a preemption defense was raised, reasoning that the existence of pre-

151 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (recognizing preemption removal doctrine but denying removal of
trademark action because of lack of preemption); In re New York, 362 F. Supp. 922
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (rejecting preemption removal doctrine); Hearst Corp. v. Shopping Center
Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (recognizing preemption removal doctrine,
but holding that absence of statutory copyright meant that plaintiff lacked the requisite
status to bring the action under federal law).
11 See, e.g., Nalore v. San Diego Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 663 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1981)
(denying removal because allegedly preempting federal regulation of homeowners loans did
not provide a superseding cause of action), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Trent Realty
Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F. 2d 29 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting preemption
removal doctrine in context of federal regulation of homeowners loans); Guinasso v. Pacific
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1981) (denying removal because allegedly preempting federal regulation of homeowners loans did not provide a superseding cause
of action), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980) (rejecting preemption removal doctrine in context of federal
savings and loan regulation), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1980) (rejecting preemption removal doctrine in
context of national bank regulation); North Davis Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 820
(10th Cir. 1972) (allowing preemption removal in context of national bank regulation);
Smart v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (rejecting preemption removal doctrine in context of federal regulation of homeowners loans); Turner v.
Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 490 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. Il. 1980) (rejecting preemption removal doctrine in context of federal savings and loan regulation); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 446 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (allowing preemption removal in context of federal regulation of homeowners loans); Rettig v. Arlington
Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (allowing preemption
removal in context of federal regulation of homeowners loans).
" See cases cited supra notes 65-67.
"9 See, e.g., Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 572 (N.D.
Cal. 1981); Teamsters Local Union 116 v. Fargo-Moorhead Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 459 F. Supp.
558, 561 (D.N.D. 1978); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 446 F.
Supp. 210, 212 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F.
Supp. 819, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
70 See, e.g., North Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 234 (2d
Cir. 1978)("The allegations of appellant's complaint show that its claim is based upon the
loss of goods during interstate transportation [, which] sets forth a claim arising under federal law."); Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir.) ("[A] fair construction of the
complaint here filed must be that it is necessarily one pursuant to § 301(a) [of the LMRA]
....
"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966).
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emption necessarily meant that a federal question was presented.7 1
Preemption removal met with substantial resistance, however.
In La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co.,7 2 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit emphasized that the removal statute
should be narrowly construed to protect the jurisdiction of state
courts.73 The court rejected Fay expressly, reasoning that federal
district courts should not "engraft exceptions [onto the wellpleaded complaint rule] contrary to the legislative policy so zealously protected by the Supreme Court."7 4 Other courts, often relying on Gully, reasoned that since preemption is raised by the defendant, it is indistinguishable from other federal defenses, and
cannot be used to convert a complaint that relies on state law into
a case arising under federal law.75 Moreover, such courts reasoned,
comity would best be served by allowing state courts to rule first
on the question of preemption, because state courts can be safely
trusted to apply federal law76 and because there will ultimately be
review in a federal forum through appeal to the Supreme Court.'

11 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 390 F. Supp. 861, 864
(E.D. La. 1974); Gardner v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 383 F. Supp. 151, 152 (E.D. Wis.
1974). As this comment demonstrates, such an assertion is completely incorrect under the
rule of FranchiseTax Board. See infra notes 96-122 and accompanying text. The essence of
preemption removal is the recognition that the plaintiff's cause of action is in fact federal,
so that removal is allowed within the well-pleaded complaint rule. Under the analysis to be
developed in this comment, the basis for removal based on preemption is that the peculiarly
strong federal interest which underlies certain instances of preemption is sufficient to displace the ordinary rule of Gully that, for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule, the
plaintiff is master of his complaint. If federal preemption is not of this nature, but is merely
a defense, removal is improper. The problem left by FranchiseTax Board is how to tell one
kind of preemption from the other. This comment offers one suggestion. See infra notes
143-57 and accompanying text.
72 506 F.2d 339, 343-45 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1006 (1975). Lacoste instituted a state law declaratory judgment action in state court. Alligator sought removal, arguing that the Skelly Oil declaratory judgment rule ought to apply and that the court must
unravel the complaint in order to determine what the action would be in an ordinary lawsuit. Alligator claimed that the action so revealed was preempted by federal law. The court
disagreed, holding that even if the federal declaratory judgment rule were to apply to a state
declaratory judgment action, there existed no preemption in the case before it, and therefore, even if Fay were correct, removal would be improper. See id. at 345-46.
7 Id. at 344-45.
7 Id. at 345.
76 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 852 (8th Cir. 1980);
Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 660 (9th Cir.
1972); Bailey v. Logan Square Typographers, Inc., 441 F.2d 47, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1971).
6 See, e.g., Bailey v. Logan Square Typographers, Inc., 441 F.2d 47, 52 (7th Cir. 1971);
Freeman v. Colonial Liquors, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D. Md. 1980); Eure v. NVF Co.,
481 F. Supp. 639, 643 (E.D.N.C. 1979).
7 See, e.g., Freeman v. Colonial Liquors, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D.Md. 1980);
Johnson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 418 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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B. The Development of Preemption Removal in the Lower
Courts
Preemption removal expanded despite these objections.7 8 Application of preemption removal remained difficult in two respects,
however, even for those courts adopting the doctrine. First, as
noted above, there was confusion as to the proper understanding of
the well-pleaded complaint rule.7 9 Some courts quite understandably read the Gully statement of the rule as requiring the language
of the plaintiff's complaint itself to present a federal question, and
either rejected preemption removal outright, 0 or created an exception to the rule in cases where the plaintiff allegedly pleaded in
bad faith to avoid the federal issue.s- Other courts interpreted the
rule to require that the federal question be presented by the plaintiff's cause of action, and therefore considered it proper to look
beyond the language of the complaint to identify the cause of
action. 2
A second source of confusion was the difficulty in distinguishing a defense alleging that the plaintiff's state law cause of action
had been preempted by federal law from a case in which preemption meant that the plaintiff's cause of action was necessarily a
federal one.83 Not every court made such a distinction, however.
Some courts reasoned that whenever preemption was raised as a
defense a federal question was necessarily presented, and removal
84
was therefore proper.
These two difficulties led to confusion among the lower courts
over preemption removal. This confusion frequently manifested itself in the adoption of one of two tests for identifying those cases
for which preemption removal was appropriate. First, a number of

78

See supra notes 64-68; infra notes 79-94.
See supra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.

:0 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
I'See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. This exception, the so-called "artful
pleading" doctrine, is discussed infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.

Since preemption is raised by a defendant, a number of courts considered preemption removal to be indistinguishable from other federal defenses. For example, in Smart v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mich. 1980), the court stated:
The principal problem with those cases that have held that federal preemption gives
rise to jurisdiction is that they merely assert, but do not make an effort to justify a

distinction between raising a federal defense, which clearly does not give rise to removal jurisdiction, and raising federal preemption, which they indicate does.
Id. at 1154; see supra note 71; infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text (explaining the

difference).
" See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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courts focused on the plaintiff's efforts to defeat federal jurisdiction and created the "artful pleading" doctrine.85 For example, in
Hearst Corp. v. Shopping Center Network,"8 the court reasoned
that "where Congress has explicitly said that the exclusive source
of a plaintiff's right to relief is to be federal law, it would be unacceptable to permit that very plaintiff, by the artful manipulation
of the terms of a complaint,to defeat a clearly enunciated congressional objective. '8 7 The artful pleading doctrine's emphasis on the
plaintiff's improper motive is in part a response to the Gully view
of the well-pleaded complaint rule that limits the court's inquiry to
the face of the complaint. An exception to that construction of the
rule is justified on the theory that where a plaintiff misstates the
gravamen of his claim, the court may look beyond the complaint to
determine the real nature of the claim.' Artful pleading emerged
as a dominant theme in analyzing the preemption removal
problem."

95See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Fedders Corp., 524 F. Supp. 552, 555-56 (M.D.
La. 1981); New York v. Local 144, Hotel, Nursing Home & Allied Health Servs. Union, 410
F. Supp. 225, 226-229 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Coditron Corp. v. AFA Protective Syss., 392 F. Supp.
158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Hayes v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 374 F. Supp. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa.
1974); see also 1A J. MooRE, B. RINGLE & J. WICKER,MooRE'S FR DERAL PRAcTIce 1 0.160[3.3], at 228-36 (2d ed. 1983); 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICEmD
PROCEDURE § 3722, at 564 (1975).
84307 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
S7 Id. at 556 (emphasis added). The Hearst court relied on reasoning similar to that in
Fay. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. The plaintiff's improper motive and
manipulation of his complaint, however, received additional emphasis in Hearst. The analysis in Hearst, indeed the entire artful pleading doctrine, is somewhat circular. The plaintiff's
bad faith in avoiding the federal issue is inferred from the conclusion that there has been
preemption so that the plaintiff's state cause of action must fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. No reason is given why the plaintiff cannot simply waive any federal
rights he may have and assert only his state law claim in a state court, subject to a preemption defense. Insofar as the plaintiff has this right, there is no "bad faith" or "artful manipulation" involved. It is this inherent circularity which leads this comment to advocate the
abandonment of the artful pleading doctrine. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
Prior to FranchiseTax Board, there was a conflict in the courts as to whether preemption removal could be proper absent a finding of artful pleading. Compare, e.g., Illinois v.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.) (denying removal), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 469 (1982), with North Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229 (2d
Cir. 1978) (allowing removal).
" See, e.g., North Davis Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 457 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1972);
PLM, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail, 490 F. Supp. 194, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Coditron Corp. v.
AFA Protective Sys., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 1A J. MOORE,B. RiNGLE &
J. WICKER, supra note 85, at 228-36.
"" See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (artful pleading relied upon to permit removal in order to dismiss for res judicata); In re Wiring Device
Antitrust Litig., 498 F. Supp. 79, 82-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 1A J. MooR, B. RiNGLE & J. WICKER, supra note 85, at 228-36; 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MmL,
& E. COOPER, supra note 85, § 3722,
at 564. But see Moitie, 452 U.S. at 404-10 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (rejecting Court's exten-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:634

Second, some courts limited preemption removal to cases
where federal law not only preempts state law, but also provides
the plaintiff with a superseding cause of action.9 0 In New York v.
Local 1115 Joint Board, Nursing Home & Hospital Employees Division,9 1 the court reasoned that "[w]here ... superseding federal
law does not replace rights formerly granted by State law, it is illogical to say that the litigant's claim is really predicated on a body
of law which grants him no rights. '9 2 This rationale is frequently
used to distinguish cases in which federal preemption is merely a
defense from cases in which preemption removal is considered
proper.9 The superseding cause of action rationale also occasion9 4
ally appears in combination with the artful pleading doctrine.
These cases provide the background against which Franchise
Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust s was decided. The lower courts had reflected the ambiguity in the wellpleaded complaint rule in their uncertainty over whether the court
should limit its inquiry to the complaint or engage in an analysis of
the underlying nature of the plaintiff's cause of action. Having generally accepted the latter approach in the preemption removal context, the lower courts then added to the confusion by providing
sion of the artful pleading doctrine beyond the preemption context). For a discussion of the
artful pleading doctrine in light of Franchise Tax Board, see infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Moitie, see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union,
484 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); New York v. Local 1115 Joint Bd., Nursing Home
& Hosp. Employees Div., 412 F. Supp. 720, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
91412 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
92 Id. at 723.

9" See, e.g., Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d 1364, 1366-67
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
" See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 484 F. Supp. 1290, 1292-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). The artful pleading doctrine and the superseding cause of action requirement are often treated as variations of the same principle. Artful pleading is frequently
little more than a label attached to the plaintiff's failure to plead a superseding cause of
action, and the presence of a superseding cause of action simply establishes the conditions
under which artful pleading can occur. Since both doctrines derive from the difficulty of
ascertaining precisely when the plaintiff's cause of action is necessarily a federal one, in
many cases it is true that they are one and the same. Analytically, however, and quite often
in application, they remain distinct concepts. Artful pleading involves an element of improper intent, which may be present or absent independently of whether or not the preempting federal law also provides a superseding cause of action. The tendency of the courts
to merge these approaches has obscured both this analytical difference and the real underlying basis for removal. As a result, little attention has been devoted to considering the appropriateness either of examining the plaintiff's motive as a factor in determining whether removal is proper or of requiring a superseding cause of action. This comment attempts to do
both. See infra notes 123-57 and accompanying text.
95103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983).
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additional limitations on when preemption removal applied. These
limitations took the form of the related but distinct artful pleading
doctrine and superseding cause of action requirement. Franchise
Tax Board provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
clarify these issues.
III. Franchise Tax Board
FranchiseTax Board involved an attempt by the plaintiff California Franchise Tax Board (the "Board") to recover unpaid taxes
by attaching a taxpayer's interest in the defendant Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust (the "Trust"). Because the Trust was
covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 8 the Board expected that the Trust would assert that
ERISA preempted the Board's state law cause of action. Therefore,
in addition to its attachment action, the Board filed a separate
claim for declaratory relief that its attachment claim was not preempted by ERISA.9 7 The Trust removed the case to federal district court, asserting preemption under ERISA as the basis for federal jurisdiction. 8 The district court allowed removal, and held for
the Board on the merits. 9 The Supreme Court never reached the
merits, holding apologetically that the district court had improperly allowed removal. 10 0 Justice Brennan had little difficulty in
concluding that preemption under ERISA was merely a defense to
the Board's state-law attachment claim.10 1 The Court then turned
to the Board's complaint for declaratory relief, which on its face
presented a federal question of the preemptive effect of ERISA on
the Board's state law attachment claim. The Court extended to
state-court declaratory judgment actions removed to federal court
the Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 10 2 rule that jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions should be determined on
the basis of an underlying action for damages or injunction rather
'6 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
7 103 S. Ct. at 2845.
" Id.
" Id.
100 See id. The Court noted that "[flor better or worse, . . . the present statutory
scheme [of federal question jurisdiction] . . has existed since 1887," id. at 2847 (emphasis
added), and conceded that "[t]he [well-pleaded complaint] rule. . . may produce awkward
results, especially in cases in which neither the obligation created by state law nor the defendant's factual failure to comply are in dispute, and both parties agree that the only question for decision is raised by a federal preemption defense," id. at 2848 (emphasis added).
,o,Id. at 2845-48.
101 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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than on the complaint for declaratory relief.103 The Court then
held that the well-pleaded complaint rule precluded federal jurisdiction because the underlying cause of action-the Board's attachment claim-arose under state law. 10e
Although the Court might have concluded its opinion at this
point, it went on to respond at some length to the Trust's argument that removal was proper under Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
which had tacitly approved preemption removal.108 The

735,

Franchise Tax Board Court recognized that, while a plaintiff is
normally the master of his complaint, "it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not
defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in

a complaint.110 7 The Court interpreted Avco as "stand[ing] for the

proposition that if a federal cause of action completely preempts a
state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of
the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law."108
The Court concluded, however, that the Trust's reliance on Avco
was misplaced. First, the Court reasoned, "Congress did not intend
to preempt entirely every state cause of action relating to [ERISA]
plans." 9 Moreover, "[u]nlike the contract rights at issue in Avco,
the State's right to enforce its tax levies [was] not of central concern to [ERISA]." 110 Finally, ERISA did not provide the state with
a superseding cause of action replacing its state-law claims, as was
the case in Avco."' This reasoning applied to the Board's declaratory judgment action as well as its attachment claim. 1
While Franchise Tax Board thus made clear that in some
103 For a discussion of the Skelly Oil rule, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying

text.
,04
103 S. Ct. at 2849-53. There is some question as to whether the Court correctly
applied the Skelly Oil principle. In unraveling the declaratory judgment action, the Court
assumed that the hypothetical underlying suit was based on the state-law attachment claim.
The Court ignored the possibility that the Trust might have paid the tax and then sued for
a refund, see CAL REv. & TAX. CODE § 26102 (West 1979), claiming a federally created exemption from the tax. Had this occurred, there would in fact have been original federal

jurisdiction.
10"

U.S. 557 (1968).
See supra notes 7, 60-64 and accompanying text.

207

103 S. Ct. at 2853.

105 390

100 Id. at 2854. Until the Franchise Tax Board Court explained Avco, it was unclear

whether that case could in fact be interpreted as approving preemption removal. See supra
notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
109Id. at 2855.
110 Id.
"I Id.

122Id.
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cases preemption removal was proper, the Court did not expressly
resolve the underlying uncertainty as to the proper interpretation
of the well-pleaded complaint rule, nor did it give much guidance
for the difficult task of distinguishing between cases where preemption is merely a defense and those where preemption removal
is consistent with the well-pleaded complaint rule. As a result, the
status of the artful pleading doctrine and the superseding cause of
action requirement remains unclear. Nonetheless, an analysis of
the Court's treatment of the preemption removal problem yields
insights into all three of these questions.
A.

Franchise Tax Board and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

Although the Court in Franchise Tax Board did not directly
address the ambiguity in the interpretation of the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the decision clearly proceeds from the assumption
that the focus of the inquiry under the well-pleaded complaint rule
is the actual nature of the underlying cause of action and not
merely the language of the plaintiff's complaint. 113 Indeed, the
Court found it to be "an independent corollary of the well-pleaded
complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting
to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint."' 1 4 This emphasis on the cause of action is repeated throughout Franchise
Tax Board." 5 The Court carefully distinguished cases in which
preemption is merely a defense from those in which preemption
M'See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text. In fact, although the Franchise Tax
Board Court quoted extensively from Gully, see 103 S. Ct. at 2847-48, Justice Cardozo's
famous statement that the federal question "must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal," 299 U.S. at 113, was conspicuously omitted. The only similar language cited by the Court, quoted from Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914), does not expressly preclude matters raised in the answer or petition
for removal: " '[Federal jurisdiction] must be determined from what necessarily appears in
the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything
alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.'" 103 S. Ct. at 2846 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. at 75-76).
114 103 S. Ct. at 2853. Although this language appears to reflect the concerns underlying
the artful pleading doctrine, the court's failure explicitly to phrase its conclusion in such
terms is conspicuous. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of Franchise Tax Board on the artful pleading doctrine). The quoted language illustrates the closeness of the relation between the notion of artful pleading and the underlying
basis for allowing removal, namely, that the cause of action itself is federal. See supra note
94 and accdmpanying text.
16 For example, the Court formulates the rule of Avco as follows: "if a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the
scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law." Franchise Tax
Board, 103 S. Ct. at 2854 (emphasis added); see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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affects the plaintiff's cause of action.1 1 Moreover, the extension of
the Skelly Oil principle of looking to the underlying cause of action of declaratory judgments also suggests that the proper focus of
the well-pleaded complaint rule is on the cause of action. 117
The underlying difference between the Franchise Tax Board
and Gully v. First National Bank""' interpretations of the wellpleaded complaint rule lies in their treatment of the notion that
the plaintiff is master of his own complaint. Under Gully, this notion is absorbed into and becomes part of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 11 9 Under Franchise Tax Board, the notion that the
plaintiff is master of his complaint is treated as analytically separate from the well-pleaded complaint rule. 120 In most situations,
the two views of the well-pleaded complaint rule produce the same
result, because the plaintiff's cause of action is ordinarily just what
the complaint states it to be. Thus, the incorporation into the wellpleaded complaint rule of the notion that the plaintiff is master of
his complaint is normally harmless. The Court in Franchise Tax
Board concluded, however, that, in some instances, the "preemptive force of [federal law] is so powerful as to displace entirely any
state cause of action," so that in such cases the plaintiff's right to
116103 S. Ct. at 2848 & n.11 (citing with approval cases denying removal based on

preemption defenses), 2848 n.12 ("Note, however, that a claim of federal preemption does
not always arise as a defense to a coercive action.").
See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
I18 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
12

119For a discussion of the Gully rule, see supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
Gully never expressly asserts the point, but this absorption is precisely what Gully holds.

Cardozo engrafts the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint onto the well-pleaded complaint
rule in order to simplify the task of the courts called upon to apply the rule. See Gully, 299

U.S. at 113. Although his intention is laudable, Cardozo's analysis is incorrect insofar as
inclusion of the plaintiff's control of his complaint was later taken to be an ironclad requirement of the well-pleaded complaint rule. The two concepts--the well-pleaded complaint
rule and the plaintiff's mastery of the complaint-are analytically distinct and serve different purposes. Franchise Tax Board thus abandons the plaintiff's mastery of his complaint

as an accretion to the well-pleaded complaint rule where the purposes of the
rule-determining whether a claim is actually federal-compel the Court to do so. See infra
notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
120 103 S. Ct. at 2853 (although party bringing suit is master to decide what law he will

rely on, "it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff
may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions" (emphasis
added)). See supra note 119.
Although no case has attributed the shift from the Gully construction of the wellpleaded complaint rule to that reflected in Franchise Tax Board to the laxity in modem
pleading rules, the nature of pleadings today almost certainly makes many of the administrative advantages sought by Cardozo in formulating the Gully construction, see supra notes
60-64 and accompanying text, impossible to achieve.
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be master of his own complaint must yield.121
The Franchise Tax Board view of the well-pleaded complaint
rule provides a better method for applying the rule. While applying the well-pleaded complaint rule certainly requires some concern for administrative convenience, administrability does not explain why the courts disregard allegations in a complaint that
anticipate a defense, or, more importantly, why the courts
recharacterize declaratory judgment actions to identify a hypothetical underlying cause of action. Departures such as these result
from a recognition that the purposes of the well-pleaded complaint
rule may require the Court to look past the plaintiff's complaint.
The rule requires ascertaining whether the cause of action that
constitutes the underlying dispute is actually federal. If it is a federal cause of action, there is original federal question jurisdiction.
Thus, even if one assumes that to promote administrative convenience the courts normally accept the Gully construction of the
well-pleaded complaint rule, one can understand why the same
courts also disregard this concern when the more fundamental pur122
poses of the well-pleaded complaint rule are served by doing so.

12 103 S. Ct. at 2853. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Avco. See supra notes
60-64 and accompanying text.
121 An important aspect of the Franchise Tax Board and Avco approach which the
Court has never addressed is precisely why the important federal policy of preemption requires that the plaintiff's complaint be recharacterized as federal so that removal is allowed.
It would be possible to serve the federal interest by letting the plaintiff assert only his statelaw claims, thereby essentially "waiving" any federal claims. If the plaintiff is allowed to
rely solely on state law, and that law has been completely preempted, then the plaintiff
should lose on his state-law claim in state court. If the state court is hostile to federal law
and nonetheless allows recovery, there is appellate review of the "complete preemption"
claim in the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982). The procedural protection of
federal rights under such an approach would not differ from that accorded any party asserting a federal defense to a state law claim, and it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did
not explain in FranchiseTax Board its basis for treating preemption differently from other,
similar claims.
One basis for doing so is technical. It is not the well-pleaded complaint rule that is
changed by the force of the argument from complete preemption. Rather, it is merely the
link between that rule and the notion that the plaintiff is master of his own complaint that
is severed. It is this latter interest that must give way to the preemptive force of federal law,
and, once that occurs, the courts' examination of the underlying cause of action can be
unrestrained, and the courts can recharacterize the action as arising under federal law,
whereupon standard application of the well-pleaded complaint rule will then find jurisdiction proper.
The answer that complete preemption makes the cause of action federal, however, while
technically correct, is still not completely satisfying. Why should the court presume that
plaintiff wants to assert any federal rights rather than to waive them? And if, indeed, the
plaintiff intends to waive his federal rights, the court has authority to decide neither the
case upon removal nor even the preemption issue. A more thorough analysis than that given
by the Court in Avco or FranchiseTax Board is needed to explain what purposes of federal
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Franchise Tax Board and the Artful Pleading Doctrine

Although the statement in FranchiseTax Board that "a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal
questions 123 evokes concerns similar to those which underlie the
artful pleading doctrine, 124 the Court did not expressly refer to the
doctrine in discussing preemption removal. This omission is curious given the prior dominance of the doctrine in the analysis of
preemption removal in the lower courts, 125 especially in light of the
Court's recent approval of the doctrine in FederatedDepartment
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie.12' Against this backdrop, the Franchise Tax
law or jurisdiction are served by allowing the court this liberty.
Several reasons may be advanced in support of the result. First, the distinction between
ordinary preemption and the "complete preemption" of which the Franchise Tax Board
Court speaks highlights a peculiarly powerful federal interest in the operative substantive
law. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. Congress has spoken more forcefully
when it preempts an entire field of law and has indicated its desire that only federal law
remain. This is the federal interest that compels the Court to look beyond the face of the
complaint; the necessary jurisdictional consequence is that the cause of action is made federal, permitting removal.
Second, there is force to the argument that when Congress has acted to preempt an
entire field, reliance on appeal to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) to vindicate the federal concerns is inadequate. Congress's intent was to displace state-law causes of
action entirely. Because of the time or expense involved or for any of a number of reasons,
not all appeals will be pursued. The option to remove enhances the likelihood that this
federal interest in preempting the field will not be subverted by hostile state courts. Finally,
it must be noted that the plaintiff does not lose his right to waive federal claims. He may
still waive these claims and suffer a dismissal. All the plaintiff loses is the chance to litigate
state-law claims that no longer properly have the force of law, in the hope that the fact of
preemption will not be raised.
123

103 S. Ct. at 2853.

See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
125See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
126 452 U.S. 394 (1981). The plaintiffs in Moitie had refiled actions in state court which
previously had been dismissed on the merits in federal court. Id. at 395-96. Before considering whether the later actions were barred by res judicata, the Court addressed the threshold
question of whether the district court below had properly allowed the action to be removed
from state court. Id. at 397 n.2. Agreeing that "at least some of the claims had a sufficient
federal character to support removal," id. at 397 n.2, the Court held that it would "not
permit plaintiff to use artful pleading to close off defendant's right to a federal forum," id.
(quoting C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 85, § 3722, at 564-66). The Court
accepted the factual finding below of artful pleading. Id. Moitie is a fine example of the
confused results produced by the focus on plaintiff's motive in the artful pleading doctrine.
The Court permits removal even though the plaintiff alleges state law exclusively, obviously
confusing the importance that res judicata may have as a federal policy with the force of
preemption as a federal policy. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text. Res judicata
does not provide sufficient warrant for the Court to look past the face of the complaint.
Preemption, expressing congressional as well as constitutional concerns, raises issues beyond
the mere considerations of judicial economy underlying claim preclusion. By focusing on the
intent of the plaintiffs, the Court seems to have missed this fact. In Moitie, a preferable
disposition would have been to remand to the state court to dismiss on the res judicata
124

1984]

Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

Board Court's failure to invoke artful pleading might be interpreted as evidencing a retreat from its prior acceptance of the
doctrine.
Indeed, since Franchise Tax Board separates the plaintiff's
127
mastery of his complaint from the well-pleaded complaint rule,
an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule such as the artful
pleading doctrine is no longer required. Any focus on the plaintiff's
motive is misplaced: it is not the plaintiff's bad motive which renders a case removable but rather the effect of preemption on his
cause of action. In general, where both state and federal law provide a cause of action, the plaintiff is free to ignore the federal law
and rely solely on state law even if his only reason for doing so is
to avoid federal jurisdiction. 128 After Franchise Tax Board, however, where federal law has "completely preempted" the state law
cause of action, it is proper to recharacterize the action as one that
actually arises under federal law, despite the plaintiff's usual mastery over his complaint. 2' 9 It is not the motive of defeating federal
jurisdiction that justifies removal. Whether or not the plaintiff's
state law cause has been preempted, his motive for relying on state
law is the same. The effect of "complete preemption" justifies
recharacterizing the complaint as federal regardless of the plaintiff's motives.13 0
The artful pleading doctrine's focus on the plaintiff's motive
diverts attention from the proper analysis of the relationship between preemption and the plaintiff's cause of action.1 31 For example, some courts have suggested that if the plaintiff is simply negligent, removal might be proper on the basis of a preemption
defense. ' In other cases, even where a federal cause of action has
completely preempted a state law cause of action removal has been
denied on the ground that the plaintiff had relied on state law in
good faith.13 3 Such results do not fit easily with the analysis of

defense. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
128See, e.g., Franchise Tax Board, 103 S. Ct. at 2853; The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278,
280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
,' See Franchise Tax Board, 103 S. Ct. at 2854; supra note 122.
1M0 See supra note 122.
,31For an example of the distorted results produced by the artful pleading doctrine, see
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), discussed supra note 126.
132 See, e.g, Eure v. NVF Co., 481 F. Supp. 639, 644 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (where there is an
obvious conflict between state and federal law, the plaintiff is on notice and removal is
proper).
133 See cases cited supra notes 85-88.
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Franchise Tax Board that finds justification for removal in the
necessarily federal nature of the plaintiff's cause of action. Although careful application of the artful pleading doctrine might
yield correct results, the doctrine is not essential to the rationale of
preemption removal advanced in FranchiseTax Board, and should
be abandoned.
C. Franchise Tax Board and the Superseding Cause of Action
Requirement
FranchiseTax Board is also unclear as to whether a superseding federal cause of action is necessary for preemption removal.
The Court's statement of the Avco principle does suggest that the
presence of a superseding federal cause is an important element in
allowing removal: removal is proper where "a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action .... 134 And it
does appear somewhat illogical to say that the plaintiff's cause of
action arises under federal law when federal law grants him no
cause of action. Yet, if the existence of a superseding federal cause
were a requirement for removal, the absence of such a cause under
ERISA should have been dispositive in FranchiseTax Board, and
the Court's ensuing discussion of other factors would have been
unnecessary. Moreover, in contrast to lower court cases relying on
135
the presence of a superseding cause to limit preemption removal,
the Supreme Court did not refer to the presence of a superseding
cause as a requirement; 36 the absence of a superseding cause of
action under ERISA was but one factor
used by the FranchiseTax
7

Board Court to distinguish Avco.1-

Franchise Tax Board thus leaves open the possibility that
preemption removal is in some instances proper despite the absence of a superseding federal cause of action. The question then
becomes whether such removal is consistent with the Franchise
Tax Board view of the well-pleaded complaint rule that requires
that a federal question must be presented by the plaintiff's cause
of action. If federal law merely preempts state law without substituting a federal cause of action, the only result of the preemption
is that the plaintiff loses for failure to state a claim. In such cases
preemption does indeed appear to be merely a defense. And, since
134 103
135 See

S. Ct. at 2854.

supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
136103 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
137 The Court also made arguments from the language of the ERISA statute and the
legislative history and general policies behind ERISA. See id.
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the Court in Franchise Tax Board was careful to point out that
removal could not be predicated on an ordinary preemption defense,13 8 it would appear at first glance that a superseding cause of
action is necessary.
The conclusion that the absence of a superseding federal cause
of action necessarily means that the preemption claim is merely a
defense, however, confuses the question of whether a plaintiff is
entitled to recover under federal law with the question of whether
the only body of law upon which the plaintiff could base his cause
of action is federal. The difference between these two propositions
can be illustrated by an analogy to the field of choice of law.1"'
Suppose a plaintiff from state X seeks to recover for injuries arising from an accident which occured in state Y. State X provides
the plaintiff with a cause of action, but state Y does not. The court
may determine that the law of state Y applies, but gives the plaintiff no right of recovery. 4 0 Nonetheless, it is clear that the plaintiff's cause of action presents questions of state Y law. In such a
case it is certainly not illogical to say that the case arises under
14
state Y law, even though that law grants the plaintiff no rights. '
By analogy, it is possible to conceive of situations in which the existence of a cause of action must be tested under federal law, even
though the federal law provides no superseding cause of action. Allowing removal in such cases is consistent with the FranchiseTax
Board rationale of the well-pleaded complaint rule since the plaintiff's cause of action presents questions of federal law. Although
the existence of a superseding cause of action may be relevant in
13 Id. at 2848 & n.11.
See Billy Jack For Her, Inc. v. New York Coat Workers Union Local 1-35, 511 F.
Supp. 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where the court analogized the preemption removal problem to
a choice-of-law inquiry and rejected the requirement of a superseding cause of action:
The Court finds nothing "illogical" in holding that preemption always creates
"arising under" jurisdiction, even in a case where the preemptive federal law provides
the plaintiff with no right to relief. The reports are certainly well stocked with cases
where the plaintiff maintained an action under federal law only to discover to its chagrin that federal law afforded no remedy. Surely there is nothing illogical in describing
such cases as having arisen under federal law.
Id. at 1187. Although the Billy Jack court's rationale for rejecting the superseding cause of
action requirement is persuasive, the problem of distinguishing preemption defenses from
cases where removal is proper remains. One possible solution is offered infra notes 142-57
and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 148 Cal. Rptr.
867, 583 P.2d 721 (1978) (action by California corporation seeking damages for injury in
Louisiana to "key employee" is controlled by Louisiana law, which, unlike California law,
provides no such cause of action).
139

141

See supra note 139.
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determining whether the plaintiff's cause of action is within the
field of law preempted by federal law, 141 it should not be the primary focus in distinguishing cases in which preemption is merely a
defense from cases where preemption removal is proper.
Thus the existence or nonexistence of a superseding federal
cause of action does not form a dispositive basis for distinguishing
preemption defenses from cases where removal is proper; yet the
distinction must still be made. The appropriate, though more difficult, inquiry is whether any cause of action which could be
presented by the plaintiff's complaint must be created by federal
law. A two-part test for making this determination is suggested by
the manner in which the FranchiseTax Board Court distinguished
the case before it from that presented in Avco, where removal was
allowed.1 43
The first part of the test is an inquiry into the nature of the
preemption involved. Under traditional preemption doctrine, if
federal law is said to occupy an entire field of regulation ("field
preemption"), it will preempt any state law in that field, whether
or not the particular state law impairs the federal law's operation.1 4 A finding of field preemption is based upon congressional
intent, generally express but sometimes inferred from the dominance of federal regulation in the particular field. 145 A second kind
of preemption occurs, however, when a state statute as construed
conflicts with, or impairs the operation of, a federal law, in which
case the supremacy clause of the Constitution1 4 requires the state
law to yield ("conflict preemption"). 4 7 The distinction between
these two forms of preemption is often elusive. Conflict preemption is only that minimal preemption necessary to insure the
supremacy of federal law by preventing state laws from impairing
the federal law's operation. Field preemption, on the other hand,

See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
See Franchise Tax Board, 103 S. Ct. at 2853-55.
144 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Camp142

143

bell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice v.
Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623
(1975) (discussing expansion of preemption under the Warren Court, and the subsequent
decline under the Burger Court); Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of
Federal Preemption, 22 J. PuB. L. 391 (1973) (distinguishing between preemption and federal supremacy and between preemption and systematic prohibition of state power).
M4See authorities cited supra note 144.
146 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
1 7 See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 1 (1820).
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casts a broader net when Congress decides that an area of law
must be exclusively federal.
In distinguishing Avco, the Court in Franchise Tax Board
noted that "Congress did not intend to preempt entirely every
state cause of action relating to [ERISA] plans. '14 8 This language
suggests that ERISA, unlike section 301 of the LMRA at issue in
Avco, does not occupy the field, and that any preemption involved
in the Franchise Tax Board case was conflict preemption.
Although few of the courts that have considered preemption
removal have expressly adverted to the distinction between field
and conflict preemption, the language of courts approving preemp14 9
tion removal reveals that field preemption was usually involved.
In addition, the differences between field and conflict preemption
support the conclusion that removal should be allowed only where
field preemption is involved. Conflict preemption can only arise in
defense to a state law claim, since conflict preemption requires
construction of both state and federal law in order to determine if
they are compatible; preemption occurs only because the plaintiff's
right to recover under state law as properly construed conflicts
with federal law. 150 By contrast, if federal law occupies the field, all
state law in that field is displaced whether or not it impairs federal
law,1 51 and any cause of action within that field must be tested
under federal law. Conflict preemption requires that the court
closely examine the nature and operation of the state law in order
to determine the extent to which the operation of federal laws may
be impaired-something comity urges be left to the states in the
first instance with federal court review on appeal.1 5 2 Field preemp-

tion, on the other hand, requires only that the federal court examine the general subject matter of the state law in order to ascer148 103 S. Ct. at 2855.
1'4 See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 446 F. Supp.

210, 212 (N.D. Ala. 1978) ("It seems clear that there has been federal preemption in the
field .... "); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823
(N.D. Ill.
1975) ("[Clourts have consistently recognized the congressional intent to have federal law govern the regulation and supervision of federal associations."). But cf. Gunter v.
Ago Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 88-90 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (approving removal in securities law
context because of conflict between state and federal law); Eure v. NVF Co., 481 F. Supp.
639, 644 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (rejecting preemption removal generally but indicating that artful
pleading would be found where state and federal law conflict directly).
'1 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
182Cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (approving
abstention where an area of peculiar interest to state is involved); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (abstain where state law is unclear to let state court
decide and thus "avoid[] needless friction with state policies").
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tain if it regulates activity that is "arguably subject" to the federal
15 3
regulation.
More importantly, the nature of the federal policy interest involved in field preemption is arguably greater than that involved in
conflict preemption. The occupation of an entire field of law to the
exclusion of any state law implies a special concern on the part of
Congress for the need for uniform federal regulation in the field
above and beyond the concern emanating solely out of the
supremacy clause. That this is the expression of a stronger federal
interest than that expressed by ordinary conflict preemption is evidenced by the presumption of validity accorded state law in cases
54
of conflict preemption.1
If the federal law in question has in fact occupied the field, the
second step in considering whether removal is proper is to determine whether the plaintiff's cause of action is within that field.
This factor also figured in the Court's denial of removal in
Franchise Tax Board. Assuming for purposes of this portion of its
discussion that federal law had occupied the field of ERISA trusts,
the Court noted that the scope of the occupied field was nonetheless limited: the statute in question did not "purport to reach
every question relating to plans covered by ERISA."'I5 Thus, in
Franchise Tax Board, unlike in Avco, the plaintiff's state-law
cause of action to recover taxes was not "of central concern to the
federal statute,"'' 5 and the cause of action could not be within a
field of law preempted by ERISA. It is in this context that the
Court's inquiry into the existence of a superseding cause of action' 17 is relevant. If there is a superseding cause that concerns the
same subject-matter as the state cause of action alleged in the
complaint, then the state law cause of action certainly touches on
areas of central concern to the federal law, and is within the
preempted field.
CONCLUSION

This comment has attempted to provide a systematic analysis
of the preemption removal problem. The halting emergence of the
preemption removal problem, and the disarray it evoked in the
153

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (finding Cali-

fornia labor laws preempted by federal labor law).
I5 See 103 S. Ct. at 2855.
155 Id. at 2854.
156 Id. at 2855.
15 See id.
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lower courts, was exacerbated by underlying uncertainties regarding the proper application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. In
Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court recognized preemption
removal in certain cases, and appears to have decided the appropriate general method of applying the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Examination of Franchise Tax Board suggests that the decision is
inconsistent with a construction of the well-pleaded complaint rule
that strictly limits a court's inquiry to the language of the plaintiff's complaint. Rather, at least in the preemption context,
Franchise Tax Board calls for a construction of the rule that requires an examination of the true nature of the plaintiff's underlying cause of action. In light of this interpretation of Franchise Tax
Board, the comment argues that the artful pleading doctrine cannot be said to reflect accurately the principles underlying the Supreme Court's recognition of preemption removal. Finally, the
comment suggests that a superseding cause of action, though a significant factor, is not always necessary for preemption removal,
and proposes a two-step test for determining whether removal is
proper in a given case: first, whether the federal law at issue has
preempted an entire field of state law; and second, whether the
state law upon which the plaintiff bases his claim is within that
field.
Richard E. Levy

